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While fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) is a fairly new realm of cryptography, it has
shown to be a promising mode of information protection as it allows arbitrary compu-
tations on encrypted data. The development of a practical FHE scheme would enable
the development of secure cloud computation over sensitive data, which is a much-needed
technology in today’s trend of outsourced computation and storage. The first FHE scheme
was proposed by Craig Gentry in 2009, and although it was not a practical implementa-
tion, his scheme laid the groundwork for many schemes that exist today. One main focus
in FHE research is the creation of a library that allows users without much knowledge of
the complexities of FHE to use the technology securely. In this paper, we will present the
concepts behind FHE, together with the introduction of three open-source FHE libraries,
in order to bring better understanding to how the libraries function.
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1 Introduction
In the not so distant future, the majority of storage and computation of data will take
place in the cloud. In 2018, 81% of companies with at least 1,000 employees already
utilized cloud computing technology in their everyday processes, and this percentage is
expected to breach 90% by 2024 [48]. Cloud computing is a promising technology as it
offers the benefits of flexibility, improved disaster recovery, and increased collaboration
from which organizations can benefit. In spite of these benefits, major security issues can
arise when critical data is stored in the cloud. Confidentiality of information in the cloud
is not guaranteed, which is an immense hindrance to the adoption of cloud computing
technology. But, if suitable encryption is applied to data before storage this problem can
be mitigated.
Unfortunately, a new issue arises with this solution. Every time that a computation
needs to be performed on the encrypted data in the cloud, the data would first have to be
downloaded and decrypted on the client side. Then, after the data is processed, it would
have to be re-encrypted and re-uploaded to the cloud. This tedious and time consuming
process almost out-weighs the benefits of using cloud storage in the first place.
Homomorphic encryption (HE) is a relatively new realm of cryptography which gives
the ability to privately and securely store and compute on data in the cloud without the
necessity to decrypt it first. In addition, most existing homomorphic encryption schemes
are based on lattice cryptography, specifically the Learning with Errors problem, making
them secure against modern and post-quantum cryptography attacks. The development
of an efficient homomorphic encryption scheme would not just provide a benefit to one
specific sector, but rather it would have a wide breadth of impact in various domains rang-
ing from national security to genomics. In [3], they outline several potential applications
for HE, but here we will recount a simple example offered in 1978 by Rivest, Adleman,
and Dertouzos [49].
Consider a small loan lending company. Instead of storing their data in-house, which
requires expensive equipment, they opt to store their data through a cloud service provider.
Loan data contains highly sensitive personal information, and cannot be stored in the clear
as anyone could potentially gain access to the cloud platform and view the data.
Now consider that the loan company hires a third-party to run their proprietary soft-
ware to analyze the loan data to gain insight on how to improve their business, but do not
trust the third-party to not sell their data. In addition, since the software is proprietary
to the third-party company, they will not simply send it to the loan company to use. One
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solution to this situation is to use homomorphic encryption, or privacy homomorphism as
[49] terms it. Using homomorphic encryption, the loan company could encrypt their data
before storing it in the cloud, and allow the third-party to access the cloud in order to
download the data for computation. The analysis company would run their software over
the encrypted data and then re-upload the encrypted output to the cloud. This would
require the analysis company to modify their software to allow it to process computations
on encrypted data, but neither party ever has to reveal their secrets in this scheme.
Homomorphic encryption is not without its disadvantages though. Since it is based
on lattice cryptography, HE ciphertexts are “noisy” as error is introduced in the encryp-
tion process to hide the keys. Even worse, while the noise grows only slightly during
homomorphic addition, it grows exponentially during homomorphic multiplication. This
noise growth puts a limitation on the amount of computations that can be carried out
in an encrypted manner while still being able to decrypt correctly. It also drastically
increases run-time and storage requirements which makes it questionable if homomorphic
encryption could ever be used effectively as a cryptography scheme.
In his 2009 thesis, A Fully Homomorphic Encryption Scheme [24], Craig Gentry not
only proved that homomorphic encryption was indeed computationally possible, but con-
structed the first viable fully homomorphic encryption scheme (FHE) that allowed ar-
bitrary computations on encrypted data. Since his seminal work, research of FHE has
grown exponentially, leading to the creation of several FHE libraries that allow even a
novice in cryptography to implement the new, powerful technology.
In this thesis we will explore the mechanisms behind fully homomorphic encryption,
three important fully homomorphic schemes (BGV, BFV, CKKS), and three recent fully
homomorphic encryption libraries (HElib, SEAL, PALISADE). The rest of this thesis
is organized in the following manner. Chapter 2 will give the history of FHE and will
introduce the foundational work that has been completed in the field. Chapter 3 will
explain the preliminary knowledge required for the understanding of the rest of the thesis.
In Chapter 4, we will explore three different fully homomorphic encryption schemes as
well as an operation called SIMD that can be used to make FHE schemes more efficient.
Chapters 5, 6, and 7 will discuss the libraries HElib, Microsoft SEAL, and PALISADE,
respectively. The implementation of a simple example in each library will be carried out
in Chapter 8. Finally, the concluding remarks will be given in Chapter 9.
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2 Related Work
The idea of homomorphic encryption dates back to 1978, one year after the release of RSA.
In 1978, Rivest, Adleman, and Dertouzos published [49] which reasoned that homomorphic
encryption is a theoretic possibility. For more than 30 years it was unclear whether an
efficient solution to homomorphic encryption existed and if efforts should be exerted in
trying to find one.
There was no clear vision of how to approach the construction of a feasible homo-
morphic encryption scheme until 2005, when Regev published the Learning with Errors
problem [44]. The introduction of LWE revolutionized the cryptography world, and shed
enough light on the HE problem for Craig Gentry to see a path to a viable solution and
construct the first plausible fully homomorphic encryption scheme in 2009.
Since the release of Gentry’s publication, the development of FHE can be grouped
into three different generations corresponding to the approach taken in constructing the
FHE scheme.
First-generation FHE: The first generation of FHE development includes Gen-
try’s original scheme which used ideal lattices. Extensive design and implementation
work in the years following its release improved upon Gentry’s original implementa-
tion by many orders of magnitude in run-time performance. A year after the release
of [24], Marten van Dijk, Craig Gentry, Shai Halevi, and Vinod Vaikuntanathan
published the second FHE scheme that was based on [24], but took a simpler ap-
proach by replacing the ideal lattice computations with integer arithmetic [20]. The
schemes developed in the first-generation served as a foundation for the second
generation’s research, but they are not used in production today as they all suffer
from very rapid noise growth, which severely limits the amount of homomorphic
computations that can be performed.
Second-generation FHE: Many of the homomorphic encryption schemes cur-
rently in use today were products of the second generation of FHE development.
The second generation started in 2011 with the release of the BGV scheme by Zvika
Brakerski, Craig Gentry, and Vinod Vaikuntanathan [9]. It was followed closely
by the NTRU-based scheme LTV by Lopez, Alt, Tromer, and Vaikuntanathan in
2012 [40]. That same year also saw the release of a scale-invariant FHE scheme
called BFV by Brakerski, Fan, and Vercauteren [22]. There was then a 4-year gap
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until Cheon, Kim, Kim, and Song released CKKS, originally named HEAAN, which
allowed homomorphic computations on real numbers [14].
The majority of the schemes in this generation are based on the hard problem of
Ring-LWE. In addition, all of the schemes follow Gentry’s original blueprint in the
sense that they first construct a somewhat homomorphic encryption (SHE) scheme
and then convert the SHE scheme to a FHE scheme through the addition of some
sort of noise reduction technique such as bootstrapping or modulus switching.
Third-generation FHE: The third generation of FHE development was high-
lighted by the creation of schemes that avoid the expensive relinearization step
required in many second generation schemes to perform multiplication. The main
products of this era were the GSW scheme in 2013 by Craig Gentry, Amit Sahai,
and Brent Water [29], the FHEW scheme by Ducas and Micciancio in 2014 [21], and
the TFHE scheme by Chillotti et al. in 2016 [17]. The schemes of this era greatly
improved the efficiency of FHE, and most can bootstrap in less than 0.1 seconds, a
task that used to take upwards of hours.
With the creation of the above FHE schemes, several FHE libraries have been pub-
lished in order to allow even the most novice user to use the new encryption technology.
Table 2.1 lists 11 popular FHE libraries as well as their authors, what schemes they sup-
port, and what language they are written in.
Table 2.1: Recent Fully Homomorphic Encryption Libraries
Library Author Schemes Language
HElib Halevi, Shoup BGV C++
Microsoft SEAL Microsoft BFV, CKKS C++
PALISADE NJIT Lattice crypto library C++
HEAAN Cheon, Kim, Kim, Song CKKS C++
FHEW Ducas, Micciancio FHEW C++
TFHE Chillotti et al. TFHE C++
FV-NFLlib CryptoExperts BFV C++
NuFHE NuCypher GPU based TFHE Python
Lattigo EPFL-LDS BFV, CKKS Go
Λ© λ Crockett, Peikert Lattice crypto library Haskell
cuHE Dai, Wei, Sunar DHS CUDA
In addition, two fully homomorphic frameworks have been published which combine
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several of the FHE libraries into one platform. Table 2.2 lists two popular frameworks,
their authors, and the libraries they support.
Table 2.2: Recent Fully Homomorphic Encryption Frameworks
Framework Author Libraries
E3 MoMA Lab TFHE, FHEW, HElib, SEAL
SHEEP Alan Turing Institute HElib, SEAL, PALISADE, TFHE
With the rapid development of FHE schemes, libraries, and frameworks, it is impor-
tant that the cryptography community has a standard for how to safely set the security
parameters. In order for homomorphic encryption to be adopted in medical, health, and
financial sectors, it will have to be standardized and go through an intensive review pro-
cess by multiple standardization bodies and government agencies. An important part of
the standardization process is the agreement on security levels for varying parameter sets.
HomomorphicEncryption.org is an open consortium of people from industry, government
and academia who have undertaken the task of this standardization [38]. Specifically, they
set to uniformize and simplify the FHE library APIs, and provide education to application
developers on how to safely implement FHE.
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3 Preliminaries
Before delving into the explanation of the fully homomorphic encryption libraries, it will
be helpful to have an understanding of the underlying mechanisms of fully homomorphic
encryption itself. In this Chapter, we will explore the basics of homomorphic encryption,
somewhat homomorphic encryption, bootstrapping, modulus switching, and finally, fully
homomorphic encryption.
3.1 HE: Homomorphic Encryption
When data is encrypted under a standard modern day encryption scheme, there are only
two operations that can be performed on the data: storage and retrieval. If any com-
putation or analysis needs to be performed on the encrypted data, it must be decrypted
first. This requirement comes at a cost of time, resources, and privacy. Homomorphic
encryption schemes provide an alternative to regular cryptographic schemes by offering
mechanisms to perform operations upon encrypted data without having to decrypt it first.
Homomorphic encryption operates on a circuit level, meaning that the functions used
in homomorphic encryption must consist only of binary operations like AND and XOR.
For example, addition can be represented as the multiplication of two bits:
AND(b1, b2) = b1 · b2
and XOR can be seen as the addition of two bits modulo 2:
XOR(b1, b2) = (b1 + b2) mod 2
This is not an inherent problem as every function that a computer performs can be reduced
to some series of bit-wise functions, but as will be shown later, the depth of the circuit, or
how many operations are carried out, can greatly affect the efficiency and correctness of
the HE scheme. For simplicity, the term function and circuit will be used interchangeably
throughout this thesis.
When thinking of a regular public key encryption scheme, it can be helpful to relate it
to slamming a door that automatically locks when it is closed. Anyone can close the door,
but only the person with the correct key can unlock it and go through [27]. Homomorphic
encryption on the other hand can be thought of as a locked glove-box. Gentry provides
an attractive example in [23] that we will borrow to explain the concepts throughout this
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chapter.
Imagine that Alice owns a jewelry store and has a collection of expensive raw materials
that can be transformed into a final product and be sold for a high dollar. Alice does not
trust her workers to not walk off with the precious raw materials when she is not looking,
so she wishes to find a way to grant her workers the permission to process the materials
without having direct access to them. She comes up with an idea to put the materials
inside of a transparent glove-box, locking it with her master key, and then giving the box
to the workers. The workers can insert their hands into the gloves and manipulate the
materials into a finished piece of jewelry without ever having direct access to them. Once
assembled, the workers give the box back to Alice who can unlock it and retrieve the final
product.
In this example, the placing of the raw materials inside the glove-box and locking it
with a key, k, represents the encryption, Enck, of some set of plaintext {m1,m2, . . . ,mn}.
The workers’ manipulation of the materials with the gloves represents the homomorphism
or malleability of the encryption scheme as it allows the raw data to be processed while
locked inside the box. The final product inside the box represents the final ciphertext,
c = Enckf(m1,m2, . . . ,mn), which is the encryption of the function over the original
plaintexts.
In the above example, the property of homomorphism was showed through the ma-
nipulation of the materials by the workers, but in a real homomorphic encryption scheme,
the encryption and decryption functions can be thought of as homomorphisms between
plaintext and ciphertext spaces. Put simply, a homomorphism is the transformation of
one set into another that preserves the relationship of the elements in the first set.
Definition 3.1.1 (Homomorphism [11]). If G and H are groups, a homomorphism from
G to H is a function f : G→ H such that f : (g1  g2) = f(g1)⊗ f(g2) for any elements
g1, g2 ∈ G, where  denotes the operation in G and ⊗ denotes the operation in H.
While homomorphic encryption is a relatively new concept, homomorphism is not. In
fact, the notion of homomorphic encryption, originally called a privacy homomorphism,
was introduced by Rivest, Adleman, and Dertouzous [49] shortly after the publication of
RSA in 1978. RSA is an asymmetric encryption scheme meaning that each user must
have a public and private key in order to carry out encryption and decryption.
Let {e, n} be some public key. The encryption of message m is given by:
E(m) = me mod n
Consider two messages m1 and m2. RSA has a multiplicative homomorphic property
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as the product of two ciphertexts is equal to the encryption of the product of the two
messages.
E(m1) · E(m2) = me1me2 mod n = (m1m2)e mod n = E(m1 ·m2)
Since RSA only has multiplicative homomorphism and not addition, it is termed as a
partial homomorphic encryption scheme (PHE).
Besides the idea of homomorphism, homomorphic encryption schemes differ from other
public-key schemes as they have an additional function called Eval . In terms of writing a
program, the Eval function is where all the encrypted computation actually takes place.
Definition 3.1.2 (Public-key Encryption). A traditional public-key encryption scheme
is a 3-tuple of probabilistic, polynomial-time algorithms KeyGen, Enc, and Dec:
KeyGen: Takes as input a security parameter λ and outputs a pair of keys (pk, sk)
where pk is the public key and sk is the private key. The plaintext space P is defined
by pk the ciphertext space C is defined by sk.
Enc: Takes as input the public key pk and a message m ∈ P . It outputs a ciphertext
c ∈ C. This process is denoted as c← Encpk(m).
Dec: Takes as input the private key sk and a ciphertext c ∈ C. It outputs a message
m ∈ P if the right combination of keys is used, or ⊥ if decryption is not successful.
This process is denoted as m := Decsk(c).
Definition 3.1.3 (Homomorphic Encryption). A homomorphic encryption scheme is a
4-tuple of algorithms KeyGen, Enc, Dec, Eval:
KeyGen: Takes as input a security parameter λ and outputs a pair of keys (pk, sk)
where pk is the public key and sk is the private key.
Enc: Takes as input the public key pk and a message m ∈ {0, 1}. It outputs a
ciphertext c ∈ C. This process is denoted as c← Encpk(m).
Dec: Takes as input the private key sk and a ciphertext c ∈ C. It outputs a message
m ∈ P if the right combination of keys is used, or ⊥ if decryption is not successful.
This process is denoted as m := Decsk(c).
Eval: Takes as input the public key pk, n ciphertexts c1, c2, . . . , cn ∈ C and a
certain permitted function F . It outputs F (c1, c2, . . . , cn) ∈ C. Consider the set of
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ciphertexts ci = {c1, c2, . . . , cn} and their corresponding decrypted messages mi =
{m1,m2, . . . ,mn}. The evaluation is correct if the following holds:
Dec(Eval(F, ci, pk), sk) = F (mi)
or the evaluation of the ciphertexts that are encrypted with pk through the function
F decrypts under sk to the computation of the plaintexts themselves through F .
It is important to note that homomorphic encryption schemes do not always have to be
asymmetric. In fact, homomorphic encryption in the asymmetric and symmetric setting
are essentially the same. Transforming a asymmetric homomorphic encryption scheme to
a symmetric one is relatively simple. The main obstacle is that in the public-key setting,
the homomorphic evaluation algorithm is also given the encryption key. To overcome this
issue, the encryption key can simply be appended to the end of each ciphertext [51]. It is
more difficult to go from a symmetric scheme to an asymmetric one.
Theorem 3.1.1. (Symmetric to Asymmetric HE [30]) If E is a symmetric homomorphic
encryption scheme it can be transformed to an asymmetric one by the following process.
First, a public key must be chosen and published. This public key can be a collection of
` random bits, {b1, . . . , b`}, and the encryption of those bits `, {c1, . . . , c`}.
pk = {(b1, c1), . . . , (b`, c`)}, ci = Encsk(bi)
The amount of bits ` chosen depends on the size of the ciphertext, `  |ci|. To encrypt
a bit σ, first choose another random bit string −→r such that the inner product between
ri and bi is equal to σ:
∑






ribi). Note that the homomorphic inner product is just the
modulo 2 inner product of ri and bi.
For the purpose of this thesis, we will be focusing on the asymmetric variant of homo-
morphic encryption schemes.
3.2 SHE: Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption
Before 2009, all homomorphic encryption schemes were actually only somewhat homo-
morphic [26]. SHE is an extension of PHE which allows an arbitrary number of either
additions or multiplications, but only a bounded number of the other. This means that
SHE can only handle a limited class of permitted functions or circuits. This can be vi-
sualized through the example of Alice’s jewelry shop where the glove-boxes are defective
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and only allow the workers to manipulate the gloves for a certain amount of time, or a
certain number of steps, before they become stiff and inoperable.
One simple example of a SHE scheme built using only modular arithmetic can be seen
in [20]. For simplicity, it will be explained as a symmetric encryption scheme, but as
noted before, any symmetric encryption scheme can be transformed into an asymmetric
one. In [20], they use a security parameter denoted λ, and variables N = λ, P = λ2, and
Q = λ5.
KeyGen: Takes as input the security parameter λ and generates key p which is a
random P -bit odd integer.
Enc: Takes as input the key p and a message m ∈ {0, 1}. To encrypt the bit m,
choose m′ to be a random N -bit number such that m′ = m mod 2 and choose q to
be a random Q-bit number. It outputs a fresh1 ciphertext c = m′ + pq where m′ is
the noise of the system that masks the actual message m.
Dec: Takes as input the key p and ciphertext c. It outputs mf = (c mod p) mod 2.
Here, c′ = (c mod p) is in the range (−p/2, p/2) with the condition that p divides
c− c′ with no remainder.
Eval: Takes as input a boolean function f and a set of ciphertexts Sc = {c1, . . . , cn}.
First, f is represented as a circuit C made of XOR and AND gates. Let C† be a
copy of the circuit C, but with the XOR and AND gates replaced by addition and
multiplication gates over the integers. Let f † be the multivariate polynomial that
corresponds to the circuit C†. It outputs c = f †(c1, . . . , cn), or the computation of
the ciphertexts through the function f †.
In this scheme, the ciphertexts are near-multiples of p, but not exact multiples. For
example, consider λ = 2. In KeyGen, p is a random P = λ2 = 4 bit odd integer:
p = 1001 = 9
Now, choose the message m = 1. To encrypt m, first generate
m′ = 1 mod 2 = 1
1Meaning it only has a small amount of noise, around N -bits.
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and q as a Q = λ5 = 32 bit integer,
q = 11011010110100000011111000111100 = 3671080508
The final ciphertext is computed as
c = 1 + 9(3671080508) = 33039724573
To show that this number is a near-multiple of p consider
(c mod p) = (33039724573 mod 9) = 1
This means that c is −1 away from a multiple of p.
Despite there being noise in the system, the correct decryption can still be achieved.
Finishing out the example, take
(33039724573 mod 9) = 1 mod 2 = 1
which is the original message. This is possible because the noise exists in the same parity
as the message, meaning that the message and error are both even or they are both odd.
In addition to being a valid encryption scheme, this scheme is also homomorphic be-
cause by adding, subtracting, or multiplying the ciphertext, the underlying messages are
actually added, subtracted, or multiplied modulo 2. Despite this being a valid homo-
morphic scheme, a significant problem exists. As operations are carried out, the noise
of the system grows. Eventually it grows to a point where decryption no longer returns
the correct result. This means that the scheme can only support some functions, namely
functions where the accrued noise does not grow over p/2.
Since SHE is limited to functions that are not too complicated (e.g. functions that
only contain low-degree polynomials), one may wonder if there is any benefit to using SHE
over FHE when FHE can compute any function. In fact, there are cases in which SHE
may be sufficient or even preferred over FHE. In the case where only a simple function
needs to be computed, the overhead of SHE is much lower than the overhead of FHE 2.
For example, take the computational times for the Gentry-Halevi’s SHE and FHE
implementations shown in Table 3.1. Comparing the times for the SHE scheme and the
FHE scheme for the different key dimensions, it can be clearly seen that SHE has faster
2Here, overhead refers to the ratio of the time required for encrypted computation to the time required
for plaintext computation.
11
computation times than FHE. But, this is at the drawback of only being able to compute
some functions, not all. In addition, SHE schemes are not able to handle their own de-
cryption function without significant modifications, meaning that these types of schemes
are not inherently bootstrapable. If the SHE scheme can be bootstrapped, it can then
be used to construct a FHE scheme. The concept of bootstrapping will be discussed in
detail in the next section.
Table 3.1: Comparison of Genty-Halevi’s SHE and FHE Schemes [28]
Dimension SHE KeyGen FHE KeyGen
2048 1.25 s 40 s
8192 10 s 8 min
32768 95 s 2 hr
3.3 Bootstrapping
Once again consider the defective glove-boxes where the gloves lock after a certain amount
of time or number of manipulations. How can Alice circumvent this problem and still be
able to produce jewelry? One solution would appear if the glove-boxes have a one-way
insertion slot much like that of a mailbox. If this is the case, then one box could be put
inside another through the slot. Alice can first give a worker a glove-box, box1, containing
the raw material. In addition, she can give them several other boxes, box2 . . . boxn. Inside
each of the additional boxes is the key to the previous box, meaning box2 contains the
key to box1, box3 contains the key to box2 and so on. Note that the final box is locked
by a key that only Alice holds.
Figure 3.1: Bootstrapping procedure for Alice’s jewelry shop.
In the Figure 3.1, box1 contains the original form of the raw materials. The worker
is able to manipulate the materials into a chain and a gemstone before the gloves lock.
Then, they put the first box in the second through the one-way slot. Using the key in
box2, the worker unlocks box1 and retrieves the materials. They then finish construction
of the necklace. Alice can then use her key to unlock box2 and retrieve the final product.
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All existing HE schemes have the trait that a small amount of noise is added during
encryption. Computing homomorphically on ciphertexts will cause the noise to grow to
the point where they become so large that decryption fails [22]. Bootstrapping, originally
proposed and termed recrypt by Gentry, can be used to lower the noise in a ciphertext to
a fixed level that is determined by the complexity of the decryption circuit.
Definition 3.3.1 (Recrypt [23]). Let c1 be the encryption of message bit m with key pk1
and sk1 be a private key encrypted with key pk2 using the Enc function Enc(pk2, sk1j)
over the bits of sk1. The function Recrypt can then be described as follows:
Recrypt: Takes as input pk2, the decryption circuit D = Dec, sk1, and c1. First,
generate the vector c1 using the encrypt function Enc(pk2, c1j) which operates over
the bits of c1, i.e. encrypt c1 element wise with pk2. It returns the output of
Eval(pk2, D, sk1, c1) which effectively eliminates the pk1 portion of c1 leaving it
encrypted only under pk2.
Bootstrapping refreshes a ciphertext by running the decryption function on it ho-
momorphically. Usually, when a ciphertext is doubly-encrypted (which happens in this
scenario c1 = Epk2(Epk1(m))) the outside ciphertext is decrypted in order to get to the
inside. But in recrypt, the inner ciphertext is actually decrypted homomorphically with
the corresponding key, c1 = Epk2(Dsk1,pk2(c1)). While this decreases the noise of the sys-
tem by eliminating the noise from the inner ciphertext, additional noise is added in the
evaluate function. But, as long as the new noise added from evaluate is less than the
noise eliminated from the inner ciphertext the scheme should continue to function.
Unfortunately, bootstrapping is an extremely costly operation. The complexity of
most approaches to bootstrapping is at least the complexity of the decryption times the
bit-length of the individual ciphertexts that are used to encrypt the bits of the private
key [9]. This is because bootstrapping requires the evaluation of the decryption circuit
homomorphically, so each private key bit is replaced by a large ciphertext encrypted
representation of that bit.
3.4 Modulus Switching
Because of the large computational overhead of bootstrapping, alternative methods of
noise reduction have been proposed. The most notable one is modulus switching, proposed
by Brakerski, Gentry, and Vaikuntanathan in [9].
The main idea of modulus switching is to use an evaluator, who knows a bound on
the length of the private key sk, but not sk itself, to transform a ciphertext c mod q into
a different ciphertext c′ mod p without jeopardizing the correctness of the scheme. The
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transformation simply scales c by a factor (p/q) and rounds appropriately. If sk is short,
and p q, then the noise of the system decreases. Modulus switching allows the evaluator
to minimize the noise of the system without knowing sk and without bootstrapping,
making it a light-weight mode of noise management.
Definition 3.4.1 (Modulus Switching [9]). Let p and q be two odd moduli and c be an
integer vector. Define c′ to be the integer vector closest to (p/q)·c such that c′ = c mod 2.
Then, for any s with |[〈c, s〉]q| < q/2− (q/p) · `1(s):
[〈c′, s〉]p = [〈c, s〉]q mod 2 and |[〈c′, s〉]p| < (p/q) · |[〈c, s〉]q|+ `1(s)
where `1(s) is the `1 norm of s, 〈a, b〉 represents the dot product of a and b, and [·]q
represents and element modulo q.
It may not be inherently obvious why modulus switching works. The main idea of
modulus switching is to scale down the ciphertext c ∈ Zq by a factor β after each multi-
plication. To do this, modulus switching carefully chooses a gradually decreasing modulus
q for each level of multiplication, which allows the noise level to remain small and constant
from one level to the next. This results in a new ciphertext c/β ∈ Zq/β and a reduced
noise level e/β. By performing this procedure, the absolute magnitude of the noise in the
ciphertext decreases. Through modulus switching, k levels of multiplication can be per-
formed before reaching the noise ceiling. This is an exponential improvement compared
to the log(k) levels allowed in regular HE multiplication3.
3.5 FHE: Fully Homomorphic Encryption
While SHE schemes only allow the computation of some functions, fully homomorphic
encryption (FHE) schemes enable the computation of arbitrary functions on encrypted
data. This property makes FHE the most sophisticated homomorphic encryption scheme
and the “holy grail” of modern cryptography.
The underlying concept of FHE is rather simple. Given a set of ciphertexts, {c1, · · · , cn}
that are the encryption of messages {m1, . . . ,mn}, a FHE scheme should allow anyone to
output a ciphertext that is the encryption of f(m1, . . . ,mn) for any function f , as long as
f can be efficiently4 computed. In other words, if a user has a function f and wants to get
the result of the plaintexts through the function, then it is possible to instead compute
on the ciphertexts to obtain a result that decrypts to f(m1, . . . ,mn). There should be
3See [9] for a more detailed explanation of how this exponential improvement is achieved.
4In this setting, a function f is efficient if the cost of evaluating f depends polynomially on a security
parameter as well as the the complexity of the function itself.
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no information leaked about the messages, the computation of the messages through the
function f , f(m1, . . . ,mn), or any intermediate plaintext values. All components of the
scheme should always remain encrypted until the very end when the user with the private
key decrypts the final value [24].
A HE scheme is a FHE scheme if it has the algorithms defined in Definition 3.1.3 and
also satisfies the property that f can be any arbitrary function (as long as it is efficiently
computatble). In addition, if a cryptosystem can encrypt messages m ∈ {0, 1}, and can
perform addition and multiplication of the data efficiently, then the cryptosystem is a
FHE scheme if the following hold:
• Functionality: Let S be a set of valid ciphertexts S = {c1, . . . , cn} and sk be a
private key. For ci ∈ S, let Cadd = c1 + c2 ∈ S and Cmult = c1 ∗ c2 ∈ S. Then:
1. Dec(sk, Cadd) = Dec(sk, c1) + Dec(sk, c2)
2. Dec(sk, Cmult) = Dec(sk, c1) * Dec(sk, c2)
• Efficiency: For a security parameter λ:
1. All operations (KeyGen, Enc, Dec, Add, Mult, Eval) only take polynomial
time with respect to λ. This is to say that all functions can be computed
compactly.
2. All valid ciphertexts of the scheme have polynomial size with respect to λ. This
means that the ciphertext size needs to be independent of the function being
homomorphically evaluated.
The first practical FHE scheme was proposed by Gentry [24] and was based upon a
modified version of his SHE scheme in which the decryption function is squashed to make
it simple enough for the bootstrapping procedure. To do this, instead of computing the
multiplication of two long numbers5, addition of a small set of numbers is carried out
instead. The summation performed corresponds to a low-degree polynomial that can be
computed efficiently in a homomorphic fashion. In addition, a “hint” is added to the
original public key - namely, a large set with a secret sparse subset that sums to the
original private key and relies on the sparse subset sum assumption.
Gentry’s original scheme was computed on polynomials, utilizing the hard problem of
ring learning with errors (R-LWE). But instead of polynomials, FHE can be computed
on integers using the hard problem of approximate greatest common divisor (AGCD) or
5In the original decryption scheme, m = (c mod p) mod 2 can be rewritten as m =
LSB(c) XOR LSB(bc/pe). The multiplication here refers to c time 1/p.
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even on matrices by using the hardness of normal learning with errors (LWE). LWE is
considered a “hard” problem as it cannot be solved efficiently, or concretely that is it can-
not currently be solved in polynomial time. No one underlying hard problem is inherently
better than another, but rather the underlying hard problem is what provides proof of
the security of the scheme. Proof of security is crucial in the design and implementation
of any cryptographic system. Hard problems give a proof of security because if a crypto-
graphic system can be reduced to a hard to solve problem, then the cryptosystem itself
should be computationally difficult to break. In addition, the FHE libraries currently in
use do not use Gentry’s original FHE scheme, rather they use more efficient schemes such
as BGV, BFV, and CKKS. These schemes and their underlying hard problems will be
discussed thoroughly in the next chapter.
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4 Underlying Schemes
Underneath every fully homomorphic encryption library lies a fully homomorphic en-
cryption scheme. In the three libraries chosen, the three main FHE schemes used are
BGV, BFV, and CKKS. In addition, many of the schemes support SIMD operations that
introduce a dramatic decrease in run-time.
4.1 BGV: Brakerski-Gentry-Vaikuntanathan
The BGV scheme was proposed in 2012 in the paper “Fully Homomorphic Encryption
without Bootstrapping” by Brakerski, Gentry, and Vaikuntanathan [9]. BGV is a levelled
FHE (LFHE) scheme, meaning that the parameters of the scheme depend (polynomially)
on the depth of the circuits that the scheme is capable of evaluating.
Definition 4.1.1 (Levelled Fully Homomorphic Encryption [9]). We say that a family
of homomorphic encryption schemes with a positive integer security parameter L, {E (L) :
L ∈ Z+}, is levelled fully homomorphic if, ∀L ∈ Z+, every E uses the same decryption
circuit, E (L) compactly evaluates all circuits of depth at most L, and the computational
complexity of E (L)’s algorithms are polynomial (the same polynomial for all L) in L, and
(in the case of the evaluation algorithm) the size of the circuit.
The depth referred to above is the multiplicative depth, which is different than the mul-
tiplicative level of the scheme. Multiplicative depth is how many sequential multiplications
can be performed while multiplicative level is the total amount of multiplications that can
be performed on a ciphertext. For example, the multiplicative depth of x1 · x2 + x3 · x4
is 1, not 2, even though two multiplications are carried out. If the equation was changed
to x1 · x2 · x3, the multiplicative depth would be 2 as two consecutive multiplications
are carried out. Multiplicative level cannot exceed the multiplicative depth, otherwise
decryption cannot be carried out successfully.
BGV allows the user to choose if they want a RLWE based version of BGV or a plain
LWE based one. The main difference between using RLWE or plain LWE is that while
they both achieve the same results, LWE does it with worse performance as the run time
of a LWE scheme is worse than that of a RLWE one. In addition to using RLWE over
LWE, they forgo Gentry’s bootstrapping procedure for noise management and instead use
modulus switching.
As explained in the previous chapter, the main idea behind modulus switching is that
an evaluator, who does not know the private key s but instead knows a bound on its
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length, can transform a ciphertext c modulo q into a different ciphertext modulo p while
preserving correctness. They use modulus switching in their scheme to keep the noise level
essentially constant while sacrificing modulus size and gradually sacrificing the remaining
homomorphic capacity of the scheme.
In the LWE instantiation, R = Znq is the ring of dimension n of integers mod q,
whereas in RLWE instantiation, R = Z[x]q/(x
d + 1) where d = 2n. This is essentially the
polynomials of degree less than d with coefficients modulo q.
N1 Analytics offers a simplistic example of polynomial ring arithmetic that we will
recount here in order to give a strong foundation for the understanding of the FHE scheme
















2 + a1x+ a0
where ai ∈ {0, q − 1} or 0 to 23. Visually, this can be depicted as in Figure 4.1 where
each loop represents one power of x that appears in the polynomial and a dot represents
one of the 24 possible values the coefficient can take. We will table this example for now
and return back to it in the BFV section.
Figure 4.1: Depiction of a polynomial ring with degree 16
and plaintext modulus 24 [35].
A detailed explanation of BGV and how to implement the full scheme can be found
in [9], but [2] provides a simplistic overview of how basic BGV functions. Here we will
recount the basic version of BGV which provides enough detail for the purpose of this
paper.
The basic BGV scheme can be broken down into 7 separate functions:
1. ParamGen(λ, µ, b): Takes as input security parameters λ and µ, and a bit b ∈
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{0, 1} to set the LWE version (RLWE or LWE). It outputs params = (q, d, n, χ)
where q = q(λ) is an odd ciphertext modulus1, d = d(λ) is a power of 2, n = n(λ)
is the dimension of the system, and χ is a discrete Gaussian distribution used for
error sampling. Note that for the RLWE variant R = Z[x]/(xd + 1), or the ring
with polynomials of degree less than d.
2. SecKeyGen(params): Takes as input the parameters params. In the basic scheme
the private key sk is sampled from the error distribution χ and belongs to the ring
R. Namely:
sk = s = (1, s′[1], . . . , s′[n]) ∈ Rn+1q and s′ ← χn
where s′[i] is the i-th coefficient of s′.
3. PubKeyGen(params): Takes as input the parameters params. PubKeyGen
first calls SecKeyGen to generate sk. From sk it extract s′. Then, it generates a
uniformly random N × n matrix A′ from the ring RN×nq where N = b(2n+ 1)logqc
and an error term e← χn. Set b← A′s′+ 2e and A to be the n+ 1 column-matrix
consisting of b followed by the n columns of −A′. It returns the public key pk = A.
4. Enc(params,m,pk): Takes as input the parameters params, the message m ∈
{0, 1}, and the public key pk. First m is mapped into the ring Rn+1q by setting m =
(m, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Rn+1q . Then, a value2 r is sampled from RN2 . The final ciphertext
output is c←m+AT r ∈ Rn+1q . Note: while not explicitly shown in this explanation
the ciphertext produced is comprised of two elements in Rn+1q . See [2] for an in-depth
explanation. The BFV section also touches on this tuple construction.
5. Dec(sk, c): Takes as input the private key sk (Note: sk = s) and the ciphertext c.
Dec outputs m← [[〈c, s〉]q]2 which is the dot product of c with s modulo q modulo
2.
6. EvalAdd(c1, c2): Takes as input two ciphertexts c1 and c2 that are encrypted
under the same sk. It outputs c3 = {(c1,0 + c2,0), . . . , (c1,n+1 + c2,n+1)}.
7. EvalMult(c1, c2): Takes as input two ciphertexts c1 = (c1,0, c1,1) and c2 = (c2,0, c2,1)
that are encrypted under the same sk. It outputs c3 = {(c1,0 ∗ c2,0), c1,0 ∗ c2,1 + c1,1 ∗
c2,0, (c1,1 ∗ c2,1)}.
1x(λ) means x is polynomial in respect to λ.
2r is a vector of size N with elements modulo 2, i.e. has values of 0 and 1.
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In the basic BGV scheme, ciphertexts grow as a result of EvalMult as shown in the
example above. When performing a d-degree polynomial multiplication on a plaintext in
BGV, the resulting ciphertext has d+1 ring elements. This problem is mitigated through
the relinearization of the ciphertext, which will be explained more in the BFV section.
To turn the explained scheme above into a FHE scheme, after performing the wanted
addition and multiplications on the ciphertext, a function named Refresh is called. Re-
fresh essentially invokes a scaling function that switches the moduli and then switches
the key which the resulting ciphertext is encrypted under. By combining Refresh with
the bootstrapping procedure a FHE scheme can be achieved [50].
BGV offers a nice optimization of the scheme with the concept of batching. The
main idea behind batching is to pack multiple plaintexts into each ciphertext so that a
function can be homomorphically evaluated on multiple inputs with approximately the
same efficiency as homomorphically evaluating it on one. Batching allows the reduction
of the per-gate computation time from quasi-linear in the security parameter (O˜(λ · L3
where L is the level of the system) to poly-logarithmic (O˜(λ)). Batching, also referred to
as packing, will be discussed later in detail.
It is important to note that out of the three schemes mentioned in this chapter BGV
is the most efficient scheme when performing the same operation on multiple ciphertexts
at once due to their batching procedure. But on the opposite side, out of the three,
BGV is the most difficult to use and to implement correctly. Additionally, it can only
perform computations over integers, not complex integers or real numbers. Despite these
downfalls, BGV was chosen as a recommended scheme for HE during the Homomorphic
Encryption Standardization Workshop held in 2018.
4.2 BFV: Brakerski-Fan-Vercauteren
In 2012, Fan and Vercauteren [22] modified Brakerski’s [8] fully homomorphic encryption
scheme based on LWE to work under the security assumption of RLWE. In both [22] and
[8], they make use of relinearization, but BFV has a more efficient approach. They also
simplify the bootstrapping procedure, by introducing a modulus switching trick that [8]
did not have. These improvements will be explained throughout the remainder of this
section.
The plaintext space in BFV is Rt = Zt[x]/(x
d + 1) where t is the plaintext coeffi-
cient modulus and d is the plaintext polynomial modulus. The encryption of a plaintext
in BFV generates a ciphertext which is represented by two polynomials from the ring
with the same polynomial modulus d, but a different coefficient modulus q  t, i.e.
Rq = Zq[x]/(x
d + 1). Similar to BGV, these ciphertexts grow in size when homomorphic
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multiplication is carried out. In order to keep the ciphertext from outgrowing what the
scheme can support, a relinearization procedure3 is used to bring a n + 1 degree poly-
nomial back to degree n. Fully homomorphic computations can be carried out in BFV
fashion in the following manner:
Let λ be the security parameter, q > 1 be an integer polynomial modulus, d be a degree
with d = 2n, t be an integer plaintext coefficient modulus with 1 < t < q, δ = bq/tc, T be a
positive integer base that will be used in the relinarization key generation, ` = blogT (q))c,
R2 represent the polynomial ring with coefficients modulo 2, i.e., the coefficients of the
form {-1, 0, 1}, and χ be the a discrete Gaussian distribution over the integers with a
standard deviation σ used for error sampling.
The BFV scheme can be broken down into 7 functions [52, 22, 35]:
1. PrivateKeyGen(λ): Takes as input the security parameter λ and randomly
samples s ← R2. It outputs a private key sk = s. Referring back to the example
from N1 Analytics in the section on BGV, the private key sk can take the form:
sk = x15 − x13 − x12 − x11 − x9 + x8 + x6 − x4 + x2 + x− 1
2. PublicKeyGen(sk): Takes as input the private key sk and sets s = sk. Sample
a← Rq and e← χ. It outputs the public key pk as:
pk = ([−a · s + e)]q, a)
For example, if q = 874 and t = 7 then a and e could equal:
a =42x15 − 256x14 − 393x13 − 229x12 + 447x11 − 369x10 − 212x9+
52x7 + 70x6 − 138x5 + 322x4 + 186x3 − 282x2 − 60x+ 84
e =− 3x15 + x14 + x13 + 7x12 − 6x11 − 6x10 + x9
− x6 + 3x5 − 4x4 + 4x3 + 4x+ 1
The first part of the public key would then be constructed as shown in Figure 4.2
3In [22] they offer two different relinearization functions. For the purpose of this paper we will focus on
version 1 which minimizes the relinearization error. Version 2 minimizes the time and space requirements
of the relinearization function.
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Figure 4.2: Computation of BFV public key [35]
pk0 =− 285x15 − 431x14 − 32x13 + 86x12 − 83x11 − 142x10 − 41x9+
430x8 + 26x7 − 158x6 − 281x5 + 377x4 + 110x3 − 234x2 − 113x+ 252
Notice that despite multiplying two polynomials, which usually causes the addition
of their exponents, the degree of the plaintext polynomial never exceeds degree 15
due to the reduction of the polynomial by (xd+1). This extra plus one to the reduc-
tion introduces a sign change which helps scramble the result of the multiplication.
For instance, consider 2x14 × x4 = 2x18 mod (x16 + 1) = −2x2 shown in Figure 4.3
below.
Figure 4.3: Multiplication of polynomials modulo (xd + 1). The green dot indicates the 0
value of the coefficient and the red dot indicates how the term is moved by multiplication
[35].
3. EvaluationKeyGen(sk, T ): Takes as input the private key sk and T . Setting
sk = s, for i = 0, . . . , ` sample ai ← Rq and ei ← χ. Output the evaluation key
evk as:
evk = ([−(ai · s + ei) + T i · s2]q, ai)
for i = 0, · · · , `.
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4. Encrypt(pk,m): Takes as input public key pk and a message m ∈ Rt. First,
it separates pk into pk[0] = p0 and pk[1] = p1. Then, it randomly samples
u, e1, e2 ← χ. It computes and returns the ciphertext ct as:
ct = ([δ ·m + p0u + e1]q, [p1u + e2]q)
5. Decrypt(sk, ct): Takes as input private key sk and ciphertext ct. First, it sets
sk = s, c0 = ct[0], and c1 = ct[1]. Then, it computes and outputs the message
m′ ∈ Rt as:
m′ =
[⌊




6. Add(ct0, ct1): Takes as input two ciphertexts ct0 ct1 and returns the resulting
ciphertext ct′ as:
ct′ = (ct0[0] + ct1[0], ct0[1] + ct1[1])
7. Multiply(ct0, ct1): Takes as input two ciphertexts ct0 and ct1 and returns the
resulting ciphertext ct′ as:
c0 =
[⌊




























ct′ = (c′0, c
′
1)
8. Relinearization: The main goal of relinearization is to take the size of the
ciphertext back to at least degree 2 after a multiplication was carried out. Suppose
that some multiplication produces a size 3 ciphertext, i.e., (c0, c1, c2). To turn this
into a size 2 ciphertext (c′0, c
′
1) that decrypts to the same result requires the use of
the relinearization key created in the function EvaluationKeyGen. The natural
23
approach would be to set:
c′0 = [c0 + evk[0]c2]q
c′1 = [c1 + evk[1]c2]q
Unfortunately, since c2 can have coefficients up to size q the decryption process will








Both BGV and BFV have a disadvantage in that they can only perform computations over
the integers, or put another way, they only support discrete computations such as boolean,
integer, or modulo operations. This makes them not very practical for the majority of real
world applications since most real-world data belongs to a continuous space such as R or
C. CKKS solves this problem by allowing computation on complex numbers with limited
precision by treating the encryption noise as part of the error that occurs naturally during
approximate computations [47, 45].
CKKS was proposed by Cheon, Kim, Kim, and Song in the paper “Homorphic En-
cryption for Arithmetic of Approximate Numbers” released in 2017 [14]. The scheme
originally went by the name HEAAN, but to distinguish it from the homomorphic en-
cryption library HEAAN (which is a library that implements CKKS/HEAAN), the name
was changed to CKKS after the authors. Since its release in 2017, several improvements
have been made to the scheme such as a full residue number system (RNS) variant [16]
and an bootstrapping function for the scheme which brings it to be a FHE scheme [12]
as CKKS in the original paper was only a levelled HE scheme.
Before delving into the CKKS scheme, it is important to make the distinction between
two types of approximate arithmetic operations: floating-point arithmetic and fixed-point
arithmetic.
Definition 4.3.1 (Floating-point Representation). In the floating-point number system,
a real number is represented by a product of an integer called a significand and a scaling
vector which is usually called a scaling factor. For example, 1.011101 = 1011101∗2−6 has
the significand 1011101 and a scaling factor of 2−6. The intuition behind this represen-
tation scheme is that the floating point number is not the exact value we want to store,
but it is just the approximate value.
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Definition 4.3.2 (Floating-point Arithmetic). In floating-point arithmetic, the signifi-
cand is assumed to have a binary point to the right of the leftmost bit. In addition, the
number of bits in the significand is fixed while the scaling factor can dynamically change
during the computation. For example:
(101011 ∗ 2−5) ∗ (110111 ∗ 2−5) = 100100111101 ∗ 2−10 ≈ 100101 ∗ 2−4
Definition 4.3.3 (Fixed-point Arithmetic). For fixed-point arithmetic, the scaling vector
is fixed, but the bit size of the significand can change. For example:
(101011 ∗ 2−5) ∗ (110111 ∗ 2−5) = 100100111101 ∗ 2−10 ≈ 1001010 ∗ 2−5
Fixed point arithmetic is the preferred approximate arithmetic style for homomorphic
computations since it is more stable. CKKS supports fixed-point arithmetic but allows
for some extra noise from the scheme to be added.
In CKKS, there is a distinction between a message m and a plaintext pk. The message
m is a vector of floating-point numbers or complex numbers. It is first transformed into
a plaintext by a public encoding map before it is encrypted and computations can be
carried out. Specifically, this encoding map is a complex canonical embedding map. The
use of this type of map allows the transformation to preserve the precision of the plaintext
after encoding and decoding4. In similar fashion, to obtain the decrypted message, the
returned plaintext from the decryption function will have to be decoded back to a vector of
either floating-point or complex numbers. As mentioned, both the encoding and decoding
functions are public and are just transformations from Cn/2×R to R = Z[x]/(xn + 1) for
encoding and the opposite for decoding.
The main idea in the CKKS scheme is to treat the noise created during computations
as part of the error that naturally occurs during approximate computations. Consider
the encryption of significand m that satisfies 〈c, sk〉 = m + e mod q for some small error
e. The decryption structure m′ = m + e itself is an approximate value of the original
message m. If |e| is small enough not to destroy the significand of m, the precision is
almost preserved. For example, if m = 1.23 ∗ 104 , e = −17 then a possible decryption
could be m′ = 12283 ≈ m.
Here we will go over a basic overview of the CKKS scheme with notation taken from
[14].
Let b > 0 be a base, q0 be a modulus and q` = b
` · q0 for 0 < ` ≤ L where L is
4See [15] for an in-depth explanation of how canonical embedding works.
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the maximum level of the scheme. For a real number σ > 0, DG(σ2) samples a vector
in ZN by drawing it coefficients independently from the discrete Gaussian distribution χ
with variance σ2. For a positive integer h, HWT (h) is the set of signed binary vectors
in {−1, 0, 1}N whose Hamming weight is exactly h. For a real number 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, the
distribution ZO(p) draws each entry in the vector from {−1, 0, 1}N , with probability p/2
for each of −1 and +1, and probability 1−p of being 0. Note: ∆ ≥ 1 is the scaling factor.
The CKKS scheme can be broken down into 8 functions:
• KeyGen(λ): Takes as input the security parameter λ, and generates the parame-
ters of the scheme as M = M(λ, qL) which is a power of two, an integer h = h(λ, qL),
an integer P (λ, qL), and a real value σ = σ(λ, qL).
It then selects s ← HWT (h), a ← RqL , a’ ← RP ·qL , e ← DG(σ2), and e’ ←
DG(σ2). It generates and returns the private key sk, public key pk, and evaluation
key evk as:
sk← (1, s)
pk← (b, a) ∈ R2qL where b← −as + e mod qL
evk← b′, a′) ∈ R2P ·qL where b′ ← −a′s + e′ + Ps2 mod P · qL
• Ecd(z,∆): Takes as input a message z ∈ CN/2 which is a vector of Gaussian
integers, and returns the corresponding plaintext polynomial m ∈ R. 5
• Dcd(m; ∆): Takes as input a ciphertext m ∈ R and returns the corresponding
polynomial in CN/2.
• Enc(m,pk): Takes as input a plaintext m and a public key pk. It first samples a
vector v← ZO(0.5) and e0, e1 ← DG(σ2). It outputs the encrypted message as:
c = v · pk + (m + e0, e1) mod qL
• Dec(c, sk): Takes as input a ciphertext c and a private key sk. Taking c = (b, a)
it outputs a plaintext m′ as:
m′ = b + a · s( mod q`)
• Add(c1, c2): Takes as input two ciphertexts c1 and c2. It performs the addition of
5The technical details of encoding and decoding are beyond the scope of this paper. See [14] for a
more detailed description.
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the two ciphertexts and returns cadd as:
cadd ← c1 + c2 mod q`
• Mult(c1, c2, evk): Takes as input two ciphertexts c1 and c2 and represents them as
c1 = (b1, a1), c2 = (b2, a2). Let d = (d0,d1,d2) = (b1b2, a1b2 + a2b1, a1a2) mod q`
represent the multiplication of the two ciphertexts. Output the multiplication and
relinearization of d as:
cmult ← (d0,d1) + bP−1 ·RS(d2) · evke mod q`
where b·e stands for rounding to the nearest integer.
• RS`←`′(c): Takes as input a ciphertext c and performs the change of basis from `








4.4 SIMD: Single Instruction Multiple Data
When performing the same operations on multiple ciphertext, the Single Instruction Mul-
tiple Data (SIMD) method should be utilized in order to maximize the efficiency of the
scheme via parallel processing. SIMD allows the encryption of not just a single message
per ciphertext, but rather a vector of messages in a single ciphertexts. Then, additions
and multiplications of ciphertexts are carried out component wise. Using fully homo-
morphic SIMD operations enables a more efficient use of both space and computational
resources [53].
All of the libraries discussed in this thesis use some sort of plaintext packing, also
denoted batching, in their implementation of the FHE schemes to mimic SIMD operations
and achieve more efficient computations.
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5 HElib
Homomorphic Encryption Library (HElib)1 is an open-source software library released
in 2013 by Halevi and Shoup under the Apache License v2.0. It implements the RLWE
version of the BGV scheme and many optimizations to make the homomorphic evaluations
run more efficiently. Their optimizations include the implementation Smart-Vercauteren
[53] ciphertext packing techniques, relinearization, and bootstrapping. It is written in
C++ and makes use of the NTL mathematical library for polynomial arithmetic and
multi-threading optimizations. In addition, HElib has native implementations for Linux
and MacOS systems.
One way to view HElib is as implementing an assembly language which is executed
on a hardware platform constructed by the underlying FHE scheme [55]. The hardware
platform (the FHE scheme) defines the operation that can be applied homomorphically
as well as the cost of the operations. Like assembly language, HElib is fairly low-level as
it only carries computations such as set, add, multiply, and shift. At this time it is mostly
meant for researchers working on HE rather than production implementations.
Figure 5.1: The layers of HElib. Taken from [32] page 4.
The HElib library can be broken down into 2 main layers, namely the math layer and
the cryptography layer as shown in Figure 5.1. These 2 layers can then each be broken
down into 2 more layer. The bottom layer belongs to the math layer and contains modules
for implementing mathematical structures and various other utilities. The second layer
1http://homenc.github.io/HElib/
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also belongs to the math layer and implements the function for computing the Double-
Chinese Remainder Theorem (Double-CRT) representation of polynomials, which is a
vital function as HElib only operates over polynomials in Double-CRT representation.
This is different from other FHE libraries which deal with the coefficient representation
of plaintexts. Double-CRT has the benefit of allowing additions and multiplications to
take place in linear time, but at the cost of an expensive conversion between coefficient
and Double-CRT representations as well as the requirement to perform a key switching
function after every multiplication.
The third layer belongs to the crypto layer and implements the cryptosystem functions
such as key generation, encryption, decryption, and evaluation. Finally, the top layer
provides interfaces for using the cryptosystem to operate on arrays of plaintext values.
For more information on specifically which functions each layer provides, see [32].
It is important to note that rather than working with integers in HElib, each ciphertext
encrypts a vector v ∈ F n, where F can be any finite field that the user chooses. The
length of v is not chosen by the user, rather it is determined by other parameters in the
system. Typically, the vectors lie in the range of length n ∈ [100, 1000]. Operating with
encrypted vectors makes HElib very synonymous to a SIMD architecture environment.
As noted before, the costs of each operation in HElib are predefined depending on the
parameters set. But, generally the costs follow the pattern of addition being the cheapest
operation and the multiplication of two vectors being the most expensive as summarized
in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: HElib operations and their cost which is measured in time and noise.
Operation Time Cost Noise Cost
Constant Addition cheap cheap
Addition cheap cheap
Constant Mult. cheap moderate2
Multiplication expensive expensive
Rotation expensive cheap
Since mid-2018, HElib has been extensively revised to improve its reliability, robust-
ness, and performance. This includes the introduction of many new algorithms [33], more
robust parameter derivations to limit the necessity of recryption, as well as a significantly
improved bootstrapping procedure [34].




In order to install and use HElib 1.0.0, several external libraries will need to be installed.
Specifically: CMake version 3.5.1 or greater, Make, g++ version 5.4.0 or greater, pthreads,
git, patchelf, and m4. HElib has two main external dependencies, NTL version 11.0.0 or
greater and GMP version 6.0.0 or greater.
The HElib documentation offers two modes of installation. The first mode is a package
build that bundles HElib and its dependencies in a directory where they can be moved
around freely on the system to wherever the user wishes. In addition, NTL and GMP are
automatically downloaded and installed in this process. The second mode of installation
requires the user to build the libraries themselves. For simplicity, we will install HElib
using the package mode of installation. Here, we will recount installing HElib on Ubuntu
18.04 but other modes of installation can be found on their github.
1. Install the pre-requisites : CMake, Make, g++, pthreads, git, patchelf, and m4
$ sudo apt -get install build -essential cmake make
libpthread -stubs0 -dev git patchelf m4
2. Clone the HElib repository from Github
$ git clone https :// github.com/homenc/HElib.git




4. Run the CMake configuration, specifying that the mode of installation should be
package build. Other build options can be specified here as well, for example, testing
can be enabled and is done so in this example.
$ cmake -DPACKAGE_BUILD=ON -DENABLE_TEST=ON ..
5. Compile the install
$ make -j
Occasionally, the HElib installer will not be able to download GMP and NTL. If this
is the case, download the required version of each and place the .tar.bz2 and .tar.gz
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files in their needed directories /HElib/build/dependencies/Download/gmp fetched
and /HElib/build/dependencies/Download/ntl fetched then run $ make -j
again.
6. Test the install compilation
$ make -j test
Note: It will look like not much is happening as there is no progress bar while the
tests run, but just be patient. Eventually the tests will finish. If all the tests are
successful, the final output will look as in Figure 5.2.
7. Run the install
$ sudo make install
HElib comes with two examples that the user can reference when learning how to use
the library. The first is BGV general example and the second is binaryArith example.
Here, we will show how to compile and run BGV general example.
1. Go to the directory of the wanted example
$ cd ~/ Helib/examples/BGV_general_examples




The results of the BGV general example should resemble those of Figure 5.3
The easiest way for a user to build their own programs with HElib is to use CMake.
In the CMake file for the project, add the line:
find package(helib)
Then, when running CMake, use the option:
-Dhelib DIR=/usr/local/helib pack/share/cmake/helib
See Figure 5.4 for an example CMake file.
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Figure 5.2: Output of HElib test script.
Figure 5.3: HElib BGV Example output.
Figure 5.4: HElib example CMake file.
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6 Microsoft SEAL
Microsoft’s Simple Encrypted Arithmetic Library (SEAL) is an open-source FHE library
that aims for making homomorphic encryption easy to use and available for everyone [52].
The library is designed with cloud computing cases in mind, wanting to give users an easy
way to interact with encrypted data stored on cloud services without having to download
and decrypt it first. Despite FHE schemes being able to be symmetric or asymmetric,
SEAL only offers the asymmetric variants.
SEAL is already deployed by several companies, meaning that SEAL can be seen as
a production-quality open-source FHE library. For example, Intel integrates SEAL into
their neural network compiler nGraph, allowing artificial intelligence models to directly
process encrypted data.
Development of SEAL started in 2015 and it was first released under the MIT license
to the public on github1 in 2018. Currently it is on version 3.4.0, but version 3.5.0 is set
to release mid-April 2020. It was developed in C++17, although it does come with some
C# components namely the .NET standard wrapper which allows for cross-platform im-
plementation. SEAL can be deployed on Windows, Linux, MacOS, and Android, making
it a highly versatile library.
SEAL currently implements two homomorphic encryption schemes, BFV and CKKS.
The only real similarity between SEAL’s BFV implementation and the textbook imple-
mentation is that the plaintext space is still Rt. SEAL’s ciphertext space is tuples of Rq
of at least length 2, which is different than textbook BFV which has a ciphertext space
of Rq ×Rq. This change allows arbitrarily sized ciphertexts, but at the cost of losing the
compactness property of homomorphic encryption [13] and that addition and multiplica-
tion functions have to now support arbitrary sized ciphertexts. A benefit to using the
arbitrary sized ciphertexts is that there is no need for relinearization before decrypting
the ciphertext back to the wanted message.
Although SEAL’s end API is not too difficult to use, they give the warning that there is
a steep learning curve and that the user should understand many homomorphic encryption
specific concepts before using the library. This is because the performance differences can
be severe (up to 100,000 times slower) between a simple implementation, versus a highly
optimized implementation that was created by someone who is experienced with FHE
concepts. If the user tries to simply re-use or adapt code from the examples, they will
1GitHub.com/Microsoft/Seal
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most likely produce code that is vulnerable, malfunctioning, or extremely slow.
Luckily, SEAL provides extensively commented code and examples to help users
who are new to the concepts of homomorphic encryption to learn what each parameter
does, and how changing the parameters affects the overall security. All of the examples
can be found in /SEAL/native/examples and run by typing ./sealexamples in the
/SEAL/native/bin folder.
They offer six main examples, namely:
1. BFV Basics : 1 bfv basics.cpp
In this example, they show how to evaluate a simple polynomial of encrypted integers
through using the BFV mode of operation. For new users, this is the best place to
start as they give detailed explanations of the parameters used in SEAL.
2. Encoders : 2 encoders.cpp
The encoders example introduces the user to three different encoders at their dis-
posal: IntegerEncoder, BatchEncoder, and CKKSEncoder. Note that the first two
encoding schemes are only available in BFV mode and the last in CKKS mode. An
encoder takes messages from the user and encodes them into a plaintext polynomial
that can be used by SEAL.
3. Levels : 3 levels.cpp
In the levels example, the concept of levels in the BFV and CKKS scheme are
discussed. In SEAL, a set of encryption parameters is uniquely identified by a 256-
bit hash of the parameters which allows for easy access to the parameters. But, as
soon as any of the parameters change, the hash will as well. To overcome this issue,
SEAL creates a chain of encryption parameters derived from the original parameter
set. Creating this chain allows for easy access to all of the parameter sets, which in
turn enables modulus switching (i.e., changing the ciphertext parameters down in
the chain) to be performed.
4. CKKS Basics : 4 ckks basics.cpp
This example explains the basics of how to implement CKKS in SEAL. Namely, it
introduces the re-scaling function. Re-scaling is used after multiplications in CKKS
to reduce the size of the polynomial and stabilize how the polynomial expands. In
order to perform an operation involving two or more different ciphertexts all of the
ciphertexts must be encrypted under the same parameter set. To achieve this, the
modulus switching procedure explained in 3 levels.cpp is used. In the example
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they show how to compute the polynomial function pix3+0.4x+1 for several floating
point values x.
5. Rotation : 5 rotation.cpp
The rotation example shows how to cyclically rotate encrypted vectors in BFV as
well as CKKS.
6. Performance : 6 performance.cpp
Rather than an example, the performance script offers the times for all operations
in SEAL based off of user selected parameters. Tests can be run for CKKS and
BFV with both default SEAL set degrees and user specified degrees.
6.1 Implementation
SEAL can be installed on Windows, Linux, MacOS, as well as Android. The following
instructions will detail the global installation of SEAL on an Ubuntu 18.04 systems. Other
operating systems, as well as a local installation instructions, can be found on SEAL’s
github repository.
In order to install SEAL version 3.4, only CMake version 3.12 or higher and g++
version 6.0 or higher needs to be installed. SEAL has no external dependencies that must
be installed for it to function.
1. Install the pre-requisites: CMake, g++
$ sudo apt -get install build -essential
$ sudo apt -get install cmake
2. Clone the SEAL github repository to the local machine. For this tutorial, SEAL
was downloaded to a file in the home directory.
$ mkdir SEAL
$ cd SEAL






















$ sudo make install
$ cd ../..
Before SEAL is used, it is important to test that all of the modules were installed
and configured correctly. To do this, run the tests found in /SEAL/native/bin with the
command ./sealtest. If the installation was carried out correctly, an output similar to
Figure 6.1 will be shown.
SEAL also makes it simple for users to run their own programs through using CMake.
After creating the program, the user writes the CMake file in the same directory. The
contexts of the CMake file can be seen in Figure 6.2.
If the installation was done globally, CMake can be run with $ cmake ., but if SEAL
was installed to not the default location (/usr/local/), CMake must be run with:
$ cmake . -DCMAKE PREFIX PATH=<your path>
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Figure 6.1: Output of SEAL test script.
Figure 6.2: Example SEAL CMake file.
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7 PALISADE
PALISADE was released in 2017 and is currently supported by a team at the New Jersey
Institute of Technology along with the backing of several partners and collaborators in
academia (MIT, UCSD, WPI, ...) and industry (Raytheon, IBM Research, Galois, ...). It
is released under the BSD 2 clause and has cross platform support for Windows, Linux,
MacOS, and Android environments. It is written in C++ and the objects that are created
by and manipulated within PALISADE are instances of C++ classes.
PALISADE is unique from the other FHE libraries discussed in this thesis in the
sense that it is actually a lattice cryptography toolkit. In addition to being able to per-
form FHE computations, it provides implementations for the building blocks of lattice
cryptography capabilities along with end-to-end implementations of advance lattice cryp-
tography protocols for public-key encryption, proxy re-encryption, program obfuscation
and more. They also provide an experimental platform for research and development as
well as an implementation ready platform of known protocols that can directly be in-
tegrated into applications. Major contributions to secure computing have already been
made using PALISADE. The main one being that it was used as the library for a win-
ning Genome-Wide Association Studies (GWAS) solution at the iDASH Secure Genome
Analysis Competition in 2018 1.
Here, we will recount an overview of the PALISADE construction, paying specific mind
to how the scheme handles FHE computations. PALISADE offers several HE schemes to
choose from. Namely: BGV, 3 variants of BFV, CKKS, and Stehle-Steinfeld (StSt)2. In
addition, they offer other HE related protocols such as proxy re-encryption (PRE), SHE,
levelled SHE, and multiparty homomorphic encryption.
Knowing that debugging FHE applications can be a slow process due to the com-
putations on encrypted data being significantly slower and more compute-intensive than
computing on plaintext data, PALISADE provides a Null scheme for fast error checking.
Null supports the same API as BFV, BGV, and StSt implementations, but does not
encrypt the data and performs all operations on unencrypted plaintexts. It serves as a
light-duty no-security equivalent of the encrypted computing protocols so that developers
can test the correctness of their PALISADE program efficiently.
1http://www.humangenomeprivacy.org/2018/
2Version 1.7 of PALISADE also supports the FHEW scheme.
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Figure 7.1: The layers of PALISADE. Taken from [43] page 10.
Like HElib, PALISADE also has a layered design as shown in Figure 7.1. Each level
of PALISADE offers a set of services to the layer above it, and makes use of services in
the layer below. The layers of PALISADE are as follows:
1. Application: All program that use the PALISADE library functions can be found
in this layer. This layer makes calls to functions found in the crypto layer as well
as functions in the encoding layer. When developing applications, the Application
layer serves as an entry point to the rest of the PALISADE library.
2. Encoding: The encoding layer contains all the functions necessary to encode a
plaintext message into a plaintext object that is usable by PALISADE as well as
the corresponding decoding functions.
3. Crypto: All of the classes corresponding to lattice cryptography functions are
found at this layer.
4. Lattice Operations: This layer provides support for lattice constructions such as
rings. The Double-CRT representation of rings is also implemented in this layer.
Operations are performed on lattices by decomposing the operations into primitive
arithmetic operations represented as integers, vectors, and matrices. The primitive
math layer is utilized to perform these operations.
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5. Primitive Math: All low-level mathematical operations can be found at this lay-
ers. The primitive math layer provides support for basic modular arithmetic, effi-
cient Number Theoretic Transform (NTT) computations, Fermat-Theoretic Trans-
form (FTT) functions, and discrete Gaussian samplers among other functions.
The official PALISADE documentation [43] provides an easy to read and in-depth look
at all of the capabilities of PALISADE along with several sample implementations that a
user can reference when building their projects. In addition, they provide implementation
instructions on their git repository 3 that we will detail next.
7.1 Implementation
In order to install PALISADE version 1.7, a few external libraries will need to be installed,
namely: a C++ compiler with OpenMP library support, CMake, Make, and autoconf.
By default, PALISADE does not have any external dependencies but the user is given the
option to add GMP/NTL and tcmalloc third-party libraries if they wish.
Here, we will provide the instruction to install PALISADE on a Linux system, specif-
ically Ubuntu 18.04. Other OS installation instructions can be found on their gitlab
wiki4.
1. Install pre-requisites: g++, CMake, Make, and autoconf
$ sudo apt -get install build -essential
$ sudo apt -get install cmake
$ sudo apt -get install autoconf
2. Clone the PALISADE git repository to the local machine
$ git clone https :// gitlab.com/palisade/palisade -
release.git
3. Change directories to the file where the cloned PALISADE repository is and down-
load the sub-modules
$ cd PALISADE
$ git submodule sync --recursive








5. Install external dependencies such as GMP/NTL or tcmalloc if desired
6. Build PALISADE
$ make -j(number of processes)
Note: the -j command specifies the number of jobs to run simultaneously. We used
-j16 in our installation.
7. Install PALISADE
$ sudo make install
Before using PALISADE for the first time, it is important to test and clean the build
to make sure everything is functioning correctly. In the build folder:
1. Run unit tests to make sure all capabilities operate as expected
$ make testall
This step will take a couple minutes to run. If all goes well, the output in Figure
7.2 will show.
2. Run the sample example
$ cd bin/demo/pke
$ ./demo -simple -example
The output should be very similar to Figure 7.3
PALISADE makes it easy to build C++ projects by providing a sample CMake file
that can be copied into the working project directory. For example, to build a project
called TestProject perform the following:
1. Build and install PALISADE
2. Create the C++ project anywhere on your system. For this example, we have copied
the code from the CKKS example demo-simple-real-numbers.cpp into a folder called
SampleProjectBuild that was on the desktop.
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3. Copy CMakeLists.User.txt from the root directory of the git repository to the folder
of the project.
4. Rename CMakeLists.User.txt to CMakeLists.txt.
5. Update CMakeLists.txt to specify the desired name of the executable and the source
code files. See Figure 7.4 for an example.
6. Run the CMake and Make commands to build the executable. Note: the direc-
tory of PALISADE is /usr/local by default, but if upon installation the directory
was specified to be something different, the path to that directory would go where
/usr/local is here.
$ cmake -DPALISADE_DIR =‘/usr/local ‘ ..
$ make
7. Run the final program
$ ./ SampleProjectBuild
For reference, the output of the demo-simple-real-numbers.cpp example is shown in
Figure 7.5.
Figure 7.2: Sample output from running the PALISADE unit tests
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Figure 7.3: Output of running the example of PALISADE in bin/demo/pke
Figure 7.4: Updated CMakeLists.txt file.
Figure 7.5: Output from executing demo-sample-real-numbers.cpp
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8 Implementation of Example Programs
In order to show the comparison between the different libraries, we will implement the
same example program in each library for the schemes it supports. The test will be the
homomorphic evaluation of a final velocity (Vf ) given an acceleration (a), time (t), and
initial velocity (Vi). Namely, we will homomorphically compute Vf = Vi + at. While
the example is fairly simplistic, it helps to provide insight not only on how the libraries
work, but also how the libraries’ run times compare. When possible, we will use batch-
ing/packing or any other optimizations available. The target security level for all of the
tests is 128 bits, meaning that it should take an attacker O(2128) operations to break
the scheme. We compare the schemes based on timing, testing the times for parameter
generation, key generation, encryption, evaluation, and decryption. Tables 8.1 and 8.2
show the average times for each library and the standard deviations, respectively. All
tests were performed on a Dell Precision 7920 with an Intel Xeon processor and 256 GB
ram running Ubuntu 18.04 LTS. All programs are written in C++ and can be found on
https://github.com/ancarey/OpenSourceFHE.
8.1 BGV Test
The BGV scheme is available in the HElib and PALISADE libraries. Unfortunately, since
parameter selection in BGV is rather tedious, the tests between HElib and PALISADE
are slightly different. For HElib, we were able to get 2760 elements in each vector and
performed the calculations of the final velocities for each one. On the other hand, for
PALISADE we could only generate vectors with 8 elements due to the complexity in
choosing the parameters. In PALISADE for the BGV setting, several additional param-
eters have to be chosen over the other schemes it implements. The main variables being
the big ciphertext modulus, the root of unity used in the ciphertext, and the the big root
of unity which is the modulus used for the bit packing operations. There are no helper
functions to generate these values, so they have to be hand chosen and fine tuned in order
to work correctly. PALISADE is currently in the process of streamlining and improving
the process of parameter selection so in the future, the PALISADE implementation could
be fine tuned to allow vectors of length 2760. Regardless, based on the other PALISADE
experiments, it is safe to assume that the PALISADE implementation of BGV would
run faster than HElib’s. In addition, we ran the HElib scheme with vectors of length 8
for direct comparison. Figures 8.1, 8.2, and 8.3 show the outputs of the BGV test for
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PALISADE, HElib with length 8, and HElib with length 2760, respectively.
8.2 BFV Test
The BFV scheme is available in the SEAL and PALISADE libraries. The time, initial
velocity, and acceleration vectors were 2760 elements long and all of the elements were
generated randomly. Operations were performed element wise, starting first with the
multiplication of the acceleration and time vectors followed by the addition of the initial
velocity vector to calculate the final velocity. While the times for parameter generation
were fairly close for the two libraries, the times for the remaining sections were vastly
different with SEAL always being the fastest. See Figures 8.4 and 8.5 for the outputs of
the experiments.
8.3 CKKS Test
The CKKS scheme is available in the SEAL and PALISADE libraries. The time, initial
velocity, and acceleration vectors were 2760 elements long and all of the elements were
generated randomly. Operations were performed element wise, starting first with the
multiplication of the acceleration and time vectors as in the BFV tests. PALISADE was
able to do the addition of the initial velocity and a · t with no steps in between, but
SEAL required a relinearization and re-scaling step between the two. Once again, the
times for the two schemes were comparable for the parameter generation, but for all the
other parts, SEAL was significantly faster. Figures 8.6 and 8.7 show the outputs of these
tests.
Figure 8.1: Final Velocity Calculator implemented with BGV on PALISADE
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Figure 8.2: BGV on HElib with vectors of length 8
Figure 8.3: Final Velocity Calculator implemented with BGV on HElib
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Figure 8.4: Final Velocity Calculator implemented with BFV on SEAL
Figure 8.5: Final Velocity Calculator implemented with BFV on PALISADE
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Figure 8.6: Final Velocity Calculator implemented with CKKS on SEAL
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fully homomorphic encryption, while still in its development phases, has seen significant
growth over the past few years. With the hard work of companies and private researchers,
FHE libraries are being developed that enable users without much background knowledge
in FHE to be able to reap the powerful benefits it provides when it comes to online
secure storage and computation. This work has shown the concepts behind homomorphic
encryption, how fully homomorphic schemes are constructed, and the main aspects of
three different open-source FHE and lattice libraries. In addition, we implemented the
same program, the calculation of a final velocity, for each scheme in each library to
show how each of the libraries compares. In the future, we hope to use the knowledge
discussed here as a springboard into a graduate thesis on the improvement of current fully
homomorphic systems, hoping to one day get FHE as a normalized mode of encryption.
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An n-dimensional lattice L is the set of all linear combinations of n linearly independent
vectors v1,v2, ...,vn.
L = {a1v1 + a2v2 + ...+ anvn|ai ∈ Z}
In other words, lattices are mathematical structures that consist of points in an n-
dimensional space, with some periodic structure [serious crypto]. For example, consider
a lattice with n = 2:
Figure 1: An example of a 2 dimensional lattice
The linearly independent vectors v1, ...,vn that make up the lattice are called the basis
B of the lattice. Generally the basis vectors are organized into an n × n matrix where
each vector becomes a column:
B =

v10 v20 · · · vn0





v1n−1 v2n−1 · · · vnn−1

The basis in matrix form can be used to represent the lattice in the following way:
L = L(B) =
n∑
i=1
aivi : ai are integers
Manipulating these matrices is the core of lattice-based cryptography.
A.1 Ideal Lattices
An ideal is a subset I or a ring R that is:
• Closed under addition: ∀i1, i2 ∈ I , ii + i2 ∈ I
• Closed under multiplication with R: ∀i ∈ I, ∀r ∈ R, i · r ∈ I
An ideal lattice is simply a lattice with some additional algebraic structure. The main
difference between a lattice and an ideal lattice is that while normal lattices are groups,
ideal lattices are ideals.
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B LWE : Learning with Errors
In 2005, Regev [regev 2005] introduced the Learning with Errors (LWE) problem and
showed that solving LWE for the average case is as hard as solving several standard lattice
problems in the worst case. This allows cryptographic constructions that are based on
LWE to be secure under the idea that worst-case lattice problems are hard.
The main idea behind the LWE problem is trying to find a secret s given some set of
“noisy” linear equations of the form b = as + e. If the error term e did not exist, finding
s would be as simple as performing Gaussian elimination. The introduction of the error
into the equation makes the problem significantly more difficult.
The error generally comes a Gaussian distribution that is rounded to the nearest
integer and then reduced modulo q, where q can be an integer or a polynomial depending
on if plain LWE or ring LWE is being being implemented.
Definition B.1 (LWE Distribution). For positive integers n and q, an error distribution χ
taken as a discrete Gaussian distribution, and a vector s that is taken as an n-dimensional
integer vector modulo q (i.e. s ∈ Znq ), the LWE distribution As,χ generates a sample (a,b)
by choosing a ∈ Znq uniformly at random, choosing e← χ, and computing b = 〈sa〉+ e.
B.1 RLWE: Ring Learning with Errors
Ring Learning with Errors (RLWE) was introduced by Lyubaskevsky, Peikert, and Regev
in 2013 [lattice LWE ring]. It is simply a ring based version on the LWE problem explained
above.
Definition B.2 (RLWE (lattice lwe ring)). For a security parameter λ, let f(x) be a cy-
clotomic polynomial Φm(x) with deg(f) = ρ(m) depending on λ and set R = Z[x]/(f(x)).
Let q = q(λ) ≥ 2 be an integer. For a random element s ∈ Rq and a distribution χ = χ(λ)
over R, denote with A
(q)
s,χ the distribution obtained by choosing a uniformly random ele-
ment a← Rq and a noise term e← χ and outputting (a, [a · s + e]q).
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